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Abstract
In 1933, Go¨del considered two modal approaches to describing
provability. One captured formal provability and resulted in the logic
GL and Solovay’s Completeness Theorem. The other was based on
the modal logic S4 and led to Artemov’s Logic of Proofs LP. In this
paper, we study introduced by the author logic GLA, which is a fusion
of GL and LP in the union of their languages. GLA is supplied with a
Kripke-style semantics and the corresponding completeness theorem.
Soundness and completeness of GLA with respect to the arithmetical
provability semantics is established.
1 Introduction
Go¨del in [11] suggested a provability reading of modal logic S4, which is
axiomatized over the classical logic by the following list of postulates:
✷(F→G)→ (✷F→✷G) Deductive Closure/Normality
✷F→✷✷F Positive Introspection/Transitivity
✷F→F Reflection
∗Supported by PSC CUNY Research Awards program.
1
and the Necessitation Rule: ⊢ F ⇒ ⊢ ✷F .
Go¨del considered the interpretation of ✷F as the formal provability pred-
icate
F is provable in Peano Arithmetic PA
and noticed that this semantics is inconsistent with S4.
Indeed, ✷(✷F→F ) can be derived in S4. On the other hand, interpret-
ing ✷ as the predicate “Provable” of formal provability in Peano Arithmetic
PA and F as falsum ⊥, converts this formula into the false statement that
the consistency of PA is internally provable in PA:
Provable(Consis PA).
1.1 Formal provability spills over to non-standard proofs
Let Proof (x, F ) be a standard proof predicate (cf. [4, 8, 9]) x is a proof for F ;
Provable F be ∃xProof (x, F ).
Peano Arithmetic PA cannot distinguish between standard and nonstan-
dard numbers; given ∃xProof (x, F ), x may be a nonstandard number, hence
not a code of any derivation in PA. It means that Provable F →F can fail
in a model, and hence is not derivable in PA.
Indeed, consider a theory T = PA + Provable ⊥. T is consistent, since PA
does not prove ¬Provable ⊥. Hence T has a model M in which Provable ⊥
holds, but ⊥ does not.
So, the formal provability interpretation of S4 does not work; a provability
calculus was left without a semantics and a provability semantics was left
without a calculus thus opening two problems:
1. Find a precise provability semantics for S4;
2. Find a modal logic of formal provability Provable.
Problem 2 was solved in 1976 by Solovay [24], who proved the complete-
ness of Go¨del-Lo¨b logic GL with respect to the formal provability in arithmetic
PA.
In 1995, Problem 1 found its solution in Artemov’s Logic of Proofs LP
which provided a semantics of explicit proofs for S4 ([2, 3]).
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1.2 Go¨del-Lo¨b logic of formal provability
Logic of Formal Provability GL (standing for Go¨del-Lo¨b) is given by the
following list of postulates:
1. Axioms and rules of classical propositional logic
2. ✷(F→G)→ (✷F→✷G) Deductive Closure/Normality
3. ✷F→✷✷F Verification/Transitivity
4. ✷(✷F→F )→✷F Lo¨b Axiom
5. Necessitation Rule:
⊢ F
⊢ ✷F
Formal provability interpretation of a modal language is a mapping ∗
from the set of modal formulas to the set of arithmetical sentences such that
∗ agrees with Boolean connectives and constants and
(✷G)∗ = Provable G∗.
Solovay’s completeness theorem ([8, 24]):
GL ⊢ F iff for all formal provability interpretations ∗, PA ⊢ F ∗.
In 1938, Go¨del outlined a way to provide a provability semantics for
S4 ([12]): modality there should be read explicitly as proof assertions t:F
interpreted as
t is a proof of F in Peano Arithmetic PA.
This Go¨del’s suggestion was realized in Artemov’s Logic of Proofs ([2, 3]).
1.3 Artemov’s Logic of Proofs
Proof terms in LP are built from constants and variables by two binary op-
erations application “·” and sum “+”, and one unary operation proof checker
“!”. Formulas of LP are built as the usual propositional formulas with an
additional formation rule: whenever F is a formula and t a proof terms, t:F
is a formula.
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Axioms and rules of the Logic of Proofs LP are those of classical propo-
sitional logic plus axioms
s:(F→G) → (t:F→ [s·t]:G) Application
t:F → !t:(t:F ) Proof Checker
s:F→ [s+t]:F , t:F→ [s+t]:F Sum
t:F→F Explicit Reflection
Each axiom A is assumed internally provable, which is represented by formula
c:A where c is a proof constant. The fundamental property of LP is given
by Artemov’s Realization Theorem ([2, 3]): for each theorem F of S4 one
could recover a witness (proof term) to each occurrence of ✷ in F in such a
way that the resulting formula F r is derivable in LP. This theorem embeds
S4 into LP. Further interpretation of LP proof terms as formal proofs in
PA ([2, 3]) provided a Go¨delian provability semantics for LP and S4 and
completed Go¨del’s project of 1933. Nowadays, the Logic of Proofs has evolved
into a general logical theory of justification [5, 6, 7].
1.4 Comparing two Go¨del approaches to provability
Logic of formal provability GL formalizes Go¨del’s second incompleteness the-
orem
¬✷(¬✷⊥),
Lo¨b’s theorem
✷(✷F→F )→✷F,
and a number of other meaningful provability principles.
Logic of Proofs LP represents proofs explicitly, naturally extends typed
λ-calculus, modal logic, and modal λ-calculus.
GL and S4/LP complement each other by addressing different areas of
application. GL finds applications in traditional proof theory. LP targets
areas of mathematical theories of knowledge and justification, foundations of
verification, typed theories and lambda-calculi, etc.
1.5 Mixture of provability and explicit proofs
Certain principles require a mixture of both provability and explicit proofs.
Consider the negative introspection principle. Its purely modal formulation
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¬✷F →✷¬✷F is not valid as a provability principle. Indeed, let F be ⊥.
Then ¬✷⊥ reads as Consis PA and the whole formula as
Consis PA→Provable(Consis PA),
which is false, by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
There is no explicit negative introspection either. The principle ¬p:S→
t:(¬p:S), where p and t are proof terms and S is a propositional variable, is
not valid. Indeed, fix an interpretation ∗ of p and t and the standard Go¨del
proof predicate. There are infinitely many arithmetical instances of S for
which the antecedent holds. Hence t∗ should be a proof of infinitely many
theorems, which is impossible. However, the mixed language of proofs and
provability fits this version of negative introspection:
¬p:F→✷(¬p:F )
is arithmetically provable, by Σ-completeness of PA, according to which for
each Σ-formula σ,
PA ⊢ σ→Provable σ.
We develop introduced in [18] a joint logic of formal provability and ex-
plicit proofs GLA (Go¨del-Lo¨b-Arte¨mov logic) in the language with provability
assertions ✷F and proof assertions t:F , find Kripke semantics for GLA and
establish the arithmetical completeness of this logic.
GLA proved to be useful for applications in formal epistemology where
it became a template for a family of epistemic logics with justifications (cf.
[6, 7]). An elaborate proof theory of GLA and another version of Kripke
models for GLA were offered by Kurokawa in [16, 17].
2 Description and basic properties of GLA
The following two systems are predecessors of GLA:
• system B from [1], which does not have operations on proofs;
• system LPP from [23, 25] in an extension of languages of the logic of
formal provability GL and the Logic of Proofs LP.
Immediate successors of GLA are the logic GrzA of strong provability and
explicit proofs [20], and symmetric logic of proofs and provability [21].
5
Language of GLA.
Proof terms are built from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants
a, b, c, . . . by means of two binary operations: application ‘·’ and union ‘+’,
and one unary proof checker ‘!’.
Formulas of GLA are defined by the grammar
A = S | A→A | A ∧A | A ∨A | ¬A | ✷A | t:A ,
where t stands for any proof term and S for any sentence letter.
Axioms and rules of both Go¨del-Lo¨b logic GL and LP, together with
three specific principles connecting explicit proofs with formal provability,
constitute GLA∅.
I. Axioms of classical propositional logic
Standard axioms of the classical logic (e.g., A1-A10 from [15])
II. Axioms of Provability Logic GL
GL1 ✷(F→G)→ (✷F→✷G) Deductive Closure/Normality
GL2 ✷F→✷✷F Positive Introspection/Transitivity
GL3 ✷(✷F→F )→✷F Lo¨b Principle
III. Axioms of the Logic of Proofs LP
LP1 s:(F→G) → (t:F→ [s·t]:G) Application
LP2 t:F → !t:(t:F ) Proof Checker
LP3 s:F→ [s+t]:F , t:F→ [s+t]:F Sum
LP4 t:F→F Explicit Reflection
IV. Axioms connecting explicit and formal provability
C1 t:F→✷F Explicit-Implicit connection
C2 ¬t:F→✷¬t:F Explicit-Implicit Negative Introspection
C3 t:✷F→F Explicit-Implicit Reflection
V. Rules of inference
R1 F→G, F ⊢ G Modus Ponens
R2 ⊢ F ⇒ ⊢ ✷F Necessitation
R3 ⊢ ✷F ⇒ ⊢ F Reflection Rule
A Constant Specification CS for GLA is the set of formulas
{c1:A1, c2:A2, c3:A3, . . .},
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where each Ai is an axiom of GLA∅ and each ci is a proof constant.
GLACS = GLA∅ + CS,
GLA = GLACS with the “total” CS.
Theorem 1 (Internalization Theorem).
If GLA ⊢ F then for some proof term p, GLA ⊢ p:F .
Proof. Induction on a derivation of F .
Base: F is an axiom. Then use Constant Specification. In this case, p is
a proof constant.
Induction steps: by internalized rules of GLA.
Internalization of Modus Ponens immediately follows from the Applica-
tion axiom LP1.
Internalization of Necessitation rule ⊢ F ⇒ ⊢ ✷F :
For each F there is t(x) such that GLA ⊢ x:F→ t(x):✷F
1. x:F→✷F - axiom Explicit-Implicit Connection C1;
2. a:(x:F→✷F ) - , from 1, by Constant Specification;
3. x:F→ !x:x:F - axiom Proof Checker LP2;
4. !x:x:F→ (a·!x):✷F - from 2, by Application LP1;
5. x:F→ (a·!x):✷F - from 3,4, by propositional logic.
Now put t(x) = a·!x.
Internalization of Reflection rule ⊢ ✷F ⇒ ⊢ F
For each F there is s(x) such that GLA ⊢ x:✷F→s(x):F
1. x:✷F→F - axiom Explicit-Implicit Reflection C3;
2. b:(x:✷F→F ) from 1, by Constant Specification;
3. x:✷F→!x:x:✷F - Proof Checker LP2;
4. !x:x:✷F→ (b·!x):F - from 2, by Application LP1;
5. x:✷F→ (b·!x):F - from 3,4, by propositional logic.
Now put s(x) = b·!x. Note that in 2, we need an internalized Explicit-Implicit
Reflection!
✷
The list of postulated axioms and rules of GLA contains some principles
which are derivable from the rest of the system. Such redundancies are
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generally acceptable to make exposition more readable. For example, in GLA
(as well as in the Provability Logic GL) the positive introspection axiomGL2
is derivable from the rest of the system (cf. [8]). In GLA the same holds for
Reflection Axiom LP4, Necessitation Rule R2 and Reflection Rule R3. In
all these cases we decide to postulate the corresponding principles for the
sake of more concise definitions of important subsystems of GLA.
Note that for any finite constant specification CS the rule of necessitation
is not redundant in GLACS since to emulate R2 one needs an infinite constant
specifications.
Here is an example of a yet more delicate dependency in GLA: even though
Explicit-Implicit Reflection Axiom C3 is derivable from the rest of GLA∅
(Proposition 1 below), proof constants corresponding to C3 are needed to
guarantee the Internalization Property of GLA (cf. Theorem 1). Hence, we
keep C3 as a basic postulate of GLA.
Proposition 1 C3 is derivable from the rest of GLA∅.
Proof. The following is a derivation of t :✷F → F in GLA∅ without C3.
1. ¬✷F→¬t:✷F , contrapositive of LP4;
2. ¬t:✷F→✷(¬t:✷F ), axiom C2;
3. ✷(¬t:✷F )→✷(t:✷F→F ), by reasoning in GL;
4. ¬✷F→✷(t:✷F→F ), from 1,2, and 3;
5. ✷F→✷(t:✷F→F ), by reasoning in GL;
6. ✷(t:✷F→F ), from 4 and 5;
7. t:✷F→F , by R3.
✷
GLA is closed under substitutions of proof terms for proof variables and
formulas for propositional variables, enjoys the deduction theorem, and con-
tains both GL and LP.
2.1 Some principles of GLA
Positive Introspection: GLA ⊢ t:F→✷t:F
1. t:F→ !t:t:F - Proof Checker axiom LP2;
2. !t:t:F→✷t:F - Explicit-Implicit Connection axiom C1;
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3. t:F→✷t:F - from 1,2, by propositional logic.
Stability of proof assertions: GLA ⊢ ✷ t:F ∨ ✷¬t:F
4. ¬t:F→✷¬t:F - Explicit-Implicit Negative Introspection C2;
5. ✷ t:F ∨ ✷¬t:F - from 3,4, by propositional logic.
Explicit version of Lo¨b Principle. In ✷(✷F→F )→✷F both modalities
of the depth 1 can be read explicitly as
x:(✷F→F )→ l(x):F
for some proof term l(x). Indeed,
1. x:(✷F→F )→ t(x):✷(✷F→F ) - by Internalized Necessitation Rule;
2. c:(✷(✷F→F )→✷F ) - from Lo¨b Principle GL3 by Constant Specifi-
cation;
3. t(x):✷(✷F→F )→ (c · t(x)):✷F - from 1,2 by Application LP1;
4. (c · t(x)):✷F→s(c · t(x)):F - by Internalized Reflection Rule;
5. x:(✷F→F )→s(c · t(x)):F - from 1,3,4.
Lo¨b Principle cannot be realized in full. Suppose for some proof poly-
nomials u and v,
GLA ⊢ x:(u:⊥→⊥)→v:⊥,
hence GLA ⊢ x:(u:⊥→⊥)→⊥ and so F = ¬x:(u:⊥→⊥) is derivable in GLA.
Consider a GLA-derivable formula
G = c:(u:⊥→⊥).
Let us perform a substitution τ = [c/x] to both F and G. Then F becomes
¬c:(τu:⊥→⊥) and G yields c:(τu:⊥→⊥), which is impossible.
2.2 Realizable provability principles.
A Franco Montagna’s question which theorems of GL are realizable in GLA,
has been answered by Evan Goris in [13, 14].
It follows from the realization theorem for LP that all formulas of GL
⋂
S4
are realizable in LP, and the question was actually whether proof terms of
GLA were capable of realizing some other modal theorems of GL. Goris’ The-
orem yields that it is not the case.
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Theorem [13, 14]. Only those theorems of GL are realizable in GLA which
are from S4.
3 Models for GLA
In this section, we build Kripke-style models for GLA, which were described
in [19].
A frame is a standard GL-frame (W,≺, root) with the root node root,
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, ≺ is a binary transitive and
conversely well-founded accessibility relation onW (a relation ≺ is conversely
well-founded if any increasing chain a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3 ≺ . . . is finite).
Possible evidence relation (first considered by Mkrtychev and then
by Fitting) is a relation E between proof terms and formulas such that the
following closure conditions are met:
Application: E(s, F→G) and E(t, F ) implies E(s·t, G).
Proof Checker: E(t, F ) implies E(!t, (t:F )).
Sum: E(s, F ) or E(t, F ) implies E(s+ t, F ).
Model is a structure M = (W,≺, root, E ,  ); here  is a relation be-
tween worlds and formulas such that
1.  respects Boolean connectives at each world
(uF ∧G iff uF and uG; u¬F iff u 6F , etc.);
2. u✷F iff vF for every v ∈ W with u ≺ v;
3. u t:F iff E(t, F ) and vF for every v ∈ W .
Following Solovay, we define
H(F ) = {✷G→G | ✷G is a subformula of F};
for a set of formulas X ,
H(X) =
⋃
F∈X
H(F ).
A model M is called F -sound if rootH(F ). For a set of formulas X , M is
X-sound if M is F -sound for each F ∈ X .
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For a given constant specification CS, a model M is a CS-model if M is
CS-sound and CS holds in M.
Theorem 2 (Soundness) For any formula F and any constant specification
CS, if F is derivable in GLACS then F holds in each F-sound CS-model.
Theorem 3 (Completeness) For any finite constant specification CS if F
is not derivable in GLACS, then there is an F-sound CS-model with a finite
frame where F does not hold.
Proof goes by a canonical model construction with the use of technique
developed by Solovay [24], Artemov [1], and Fitting [10]. GLA∅ exhibits some
sort of a finite model property, which also yields the decidability of GLACS
for any given finite constant specification:
Theorem 4 For any finite constant specification CS, the logic GLACS is de-
cidable.
4 Provability semantics for GLA, completeness
In what follows, all proof predicates are assumed normal ([3]), i.e., satisfying
two properties.
1. Finiteness of proofs.
For every k set T (k) = {ϕ | Proof (k, ϕ)} is finite, the function from k to
T (k) is computable.
2. Conjoinability of proofs.
For any k and l there is n such that
T (k) ∪ T (l) ⊆ T (n).
Prime example: Go¨del’s proof predicate.
Arithmetical interpretation of GLA is the sum of the intended arith-
metical interpretations for GL and LP. In particular,
(✷G)∗ = Provable G∗;
(p:F )∗ = Proof (p∗, F ∗).
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Theorem 5 (Soundness of GLA with respect to arithmetical prov-
ability)
For any Constant Specification CS and any arithmetical interpretation ∗ re-
specting CS, if GLACS ⊢ F then PA ⊢ F
∗.
Proof. It is immediate that Reflection Rule is valid: if Provable F is derivable
in PA, then Provable F is true hence F is provable.
Validity of C1 and C2 immediately follows from Σ-completeness of PA.
Soundness of Explicit-Implicit Reflection takes place since t:✷F → F is
derivable from other principles of GLA, which is already proved sound.
✷
Arithmetical completeness of GLA∅ could be established following arithmeti-
cal completeness proofs from [1, 2, 3] (cf. also [25]).
Theorem 6 (Arithmetic completeness) For any finite constant specifi-
cation CS, if GLACS 6⊢ F , then there exists a CS-interpretation ∗ such that
PA 6⊢ F ∗.
Proof. The claim of the theorem follows from the arithmetical completeness
of GLA∅. ✷
4.1 Explicit-Implicit Reflection vs. Implicit-Explicit
Reflection
Explicit-Implicit Reflection x :✷F → F , as we have seen in Theorem 5, is
arithmetically valid. However, the Implicit-Explicit Reflection
IER = ✷x:P→P
is not a provable principle.
1. A proof via GLA.
It suffices to establish that IER is not derivable in GLA∅. For this we will
use an appropriate Kripke model. Take
W = {1, 2}, 1 ≺ 2, P is false at 1 and 2, E(t, F ) is always false.
2 ¬P, ¬x:P, ✷x:P, ¬(✷x:P→P ) (i.e., ¬IER)
↑
1 ¬P, ¬x:P, ¬✷x:P, ✷x:P→x:P (IER-soundness)
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Therefore, IER is false at node 2 of the model.
2. An arithmetical proof.
If P = ⊥, then x:P is provably equivalent to ⊥. Therefore, this instance
of IER is equivalent to ✷⊥ → ⊥, which is the consistency statement, not
provable in PA.
For other reflection principles of PA see our paper [22].
5 Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Sergei Artemov, Melvin Fitting, Evan Goris, Ger-
hard Ja¨ger, Makoto Kikuchi, Taishi Kurahashi, Hidenori Kurokawa, Franco
Montagna, Anil Nerode, Thomas Strahm, Thomas Studer, Tatiana Yavorskaya,
Junhua Yu, Ren-June Wang, logic groups in Bern University, Nihon Univer-
sity in Tokyo, Kobe University, Academia Sinica and National Chung Cheng
University of Taiwan for useful discussions.
References
[1] S. Artemov. Logic of proofs. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 67(1):29–
59, 1994.
[2] S. Artemov. Operational modal logic. Technical Report MSI 95-29,
Cornell University, 1995.
[3] S. Artemov. Explicit provability and constructive semantics. Bulletin
of Symbolic Logic, 7(1):1–36, 2001.
[4] S. Artemov and L. Beklemishev. Provability logic. In D. Gabbay and
F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd ed., vol-
ume 13, pages 189–360. Springer, Dordrecht, 2005.
[5] S. Artemov and M. Fitting. Justification Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, 2011.
[6] S. Artemov and E. Nogina. On epistemic logic with justification.
In R. van der Meyden, editor, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and
Knowledge. Proceedings of the Tenth Conference (TARK 2005), June
10-12, 2005, Singapore., pages 279–294. National University of Singa-
pore, 2005.
13
[7] S. Artemov and E. Nogina. Introducing justification into epistemic logic.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 15(6):1059–1073, 2005.
[8] G. Boolos. The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1993.
[9] S. Feferman. Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting.
Fundamenta Mathematicae, 49:35–92, 1960.
[10] M. Fitting. The logic of proofs, semantically. Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic, 132(1):1–25, 2005.
[11] K. Go¨del. Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkuls.
Ergebnisse Math. Kolloq., 4:39–40, 1933. English translation in: S. Fefer-
man et al., editors, Kurt Go¨del Collected Works, Vol. 1, pages 301–303.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York, 1986.
[12] K. Go¨del. Vortrag bei Zilsel/Lecture at Zilsel’s (*1938a). In Solomon
Feferman, John W. Dawson, Jr., Warren Goldfarb, Charles Parsons, and
Robert M. Solovay, editors, Unpublished essays and lectures, volume III
of Kurt Go¨del Collected Works, pages 86–113. Oxford University Press,
1995.
[13] E. Goris. Explicit proofs in formal provability logic. In Logical Founda-
tions of Computer Science ‘07, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, v.
4514, pp. 241–253, Springer, 2007.
[14] E. Goris. A modal provability logic of explicit and implicit proofs. Annals
of Pure and Applied Logic, 161(3):388–403, 2009.
[15] S. Kleene. Introduction to Metamathematics. Van Norstrand, 1952.
[16] H. Kurokawa. Tableaux and Hypersequents for Modal and Justification
Logics. City University of New York, 2012.
[17] H. Kurokawa. Prefixed Tableau Systems for Logic of Proofs and Prov-
ability. Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Meth-
ods. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 203–218, 2013.
[18] E. Nogina. On logic of proofs and provability. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
12(2):356, 2006.
14
[19] E. Nogina. Epistemic completeness of GLA. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
13(3):407, 2007.
[20] E. Nogina. Logic of Strong Provability and Explicit Proofs. Bulletin of
Symbolic Logic, 15(1):124–125, 2009.
[21] E. Nogina. Symmetric Logic of Proofs and Provability. 2010 Spring
AMS Eastern Sectional Meeting May 22-23, 2010 New Jersey Institute
of Technology, Newark, NJ, 2010.
http://www.ams.org/meetings/sectional/1060-03-29.pdf
[22] E. Nogina. On a Hierarchy of Reflection Principles in Peano Arithmetic.
arXiv preprint, 2014.
[23] T. Sidon. Provability logic with operations on proofs. In S. Adian
and A. Nerode, editors, Logical Foundations of Computer Science’ 97,
Yaroslavl’, volume 1234 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
342–353. Springer, 1997.
[24] R.M. Solovay. Provability interpretations of modal logic. Israel Journal
of Mathematics, 28:33–71, 1976.
[25] T. Yavorskaya (Sidon). Logic of proofs and provability. Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic, 113(1-3):345–372, 2002.
15
